Chapter 8
Security



Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach

7th edition

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Chapter 8: Network Security

Chapter goals:

- understand principles of network security:
  - cryptography and its *many* uses beyond "confidentiality"
  - authentication
  - message integrity
- security in practice:
  - firewalls and intrusion detection systems
  - security in application, transport, network, link layers

Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography

8.3 Message integrity, authentication

What is network security?

confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver should "understand" message contents

- sender encrypts message
- receiver decrypts message

authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm identity of each other

message integrity: sender, receiver want to ensure message not altered (in transit, or afterwards) without detection

access and availability: services must be accessible and available to users

Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy

- well-known in network security world
- Bob, Alice (lovers!) want to communicate "securely"
- Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, add messages



Who might Bob, Alice be?

- … well, *real-life* Bobs and Alices!
- Web browser/server for electronic transactions (e.g., on-line purchases)
- on-line banking client/server
- DNS servers
- routers exchanging routing table updates
- other examples?

There are bad guys (and girls) out there!

Q: What can a "bad guy" do?

A: A lot! See section 1.6

- *eavesdrop:* intercept messages
- actively *insert* messages into connection
- *impersonation:* can fake (spoof) source address in packet (or any field in packet)
- *hijacking:* "take over" ongoing connection by removing sender or receiver, inserting himself in place
- *denial of service:* prevent service from being used by others (e.g., by overloading resources)

Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Principles of cryptography

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The language of cryptography



m plaintext message

$K_A(m)$ ciphertext, encrypted with key K_A

$m = K_B(K_A(m))$

Breaking an encryption scheme

- cipher-text only attack: Trudy has ciphertext she can analyze
- two approaches:
  - brute force: search through all keys
  - statistical analysis
- known-plaintext attack: Trudy has plaintext corresponding to ciphertext
  - e.g., in monoalphabetic cipher, Trudy determines pairings for a,l,i,c,e,b,o,
- chosen-plaintext attack: Trudy can get ciphertext for chosen plaintext

Symmetric key cryptography



symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share same (symmetric) key: K_S

- e.g., key is knowing substitution pattern in mono alphabetic substitution cipher

Q: how do Bob and Alice agree on key value?

Simple encryption scheme

substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another

- monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another

```
plaintext:   abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz

ciphertext:  mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq
```

e.g.:

```
Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice
ciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc
```

Encryption key: mapping from set of 26 letters to set of 26 letters

A more sophisticated encryption approach

- n substitution ciphers, $M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_n$
- cycling pattern:
  - e.g., n=4: M_1, M_3, M_4, M_3, M_2; M_1, M_3, M_4, M_3, M_2; ..
- for each new plaintext symbol, use subsequent substitution pattern in cyclic pattern
  - dog: d from M_1, o from M_3, g from M_4

Encryption key: n substitution ciphers, and cyclic pattern

- key need not be just n-bit pattern

Symmetric key crypto: DES

DES: Data Encryption Standard

- US encryption standard [NIST 1993]
- 56-bit symmetric key, 64-bit plaintext input
- block cipher with cipher block chaining
- how secure is DES?
  - DES Challenge: 56-bit-key-encrypted phrase decrypted (brute force) in less than a day
  - no known good analytic attack
- making DES more secure:
  - 3DES: encrypt 3 times with 3 different keys

Symmetric key crypto: DES

DES operation

- initial permutation
- 16 identical "rounds" of function application, each using different 48 bits of key
- final permutation



AES: Advanced Encryption Standard

- symmetric-key NIST standard, replaced DES (Nov 2001)
- processes data in 128 bit blocks
- 128, 192, or 256 bit keys
- brute force decryption (try each key) taking 1 sec on DES, takes 149 trillion years for AES

Public Key Cryptography



symmetric key crypto

- requires sender, receiver know shared secret key
- Q: how to agree on key in first place (particularly if never "met")?

public key crypto

- radically different approach [Diffie-Hellman76, RSA78]
- sender, receiver do *not* share secret key
- *public* encryption key known to *all*
- *private* decryption key known only to receiver

Public key cryptography



Public key encryption algorithms

requirements:

1. need $K_B^+(\cdot)$ and $K_B^-(\cdot)$ such that

$$K_B^-(K_B^+(m)) = m$$

2. given public key K_B^+, it should be impossible to compute private key K_B^-

RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm

Prerequisite: modular arithmetic

- x mod n = remainder of x when divide by n
- facts:

  [(a mod n) + (b mod n)] mod n = (a+b) mod n

  [(a mod n) - (b mod n)] mod n = (a-b) mod n

  [(a mod n) * (b mod n)] mod n = (a*b) mod n
- thus

  $(a \bmod n)^d \bmod n = a^d \bmod n$
- example: x=14, n=10, d=2:

  $(x \bmod n)^d \bmod n = 4^2 \bmod 10 = 6$

  $x^d = 14^2 = 196 \quad x^d \bmod 10 = 6$

RSA: getting ready

- message: just a bit pattern
- bit pattern can be uniquely represented by an integer number
- thus, encrypting a message is equivalent to encrypting a number

example:

- m= 10010001 . This message is uniquely represented by the decimal number 145.
- to encrypt m, we encrypt the corresponding number, which gives a new number (the ciphertext).

RSA: Creating public/private key pair

1. choose two large prime numbers p, q. (e.g., 1024 bits each)
2. compute $n = pq$, $z = (p-1)(q-1)$
3. choose e (with $e<n$) that has no common factors with z (e, z are "relatively prime").
4. choose d such that $ed-1$ is exactly divisible by z. (in other words: $ed \bmod z = 1$).
5. *public* key is (n,e). *private* key is (n,d).

$\underbrace{(n,e)}_{K_B^+}$ $\underbrace{(n,d)}_{K_B^-}$

RSA: encryption, decryption

0. given (n,e) and (n,d) as computed above

1. to encrypt message m ($<n$), compute

   $c = m^e \bmod n$

2. to decrypt received bit pattern, c, compute

   $m = c^d \bmod n$

magic happens!

$$m = (\underbrace{m^e \bmod n}_{c})^d \bmod n$$

RSA example:

Bob chooses *p=5, q=7*. Then *n=35, z=24*.

e=5 (so *e, z* relatively prime).
d=29 (so *ed-1* exactly divisible by z).

encrypting 8-bit messages.

	bit pattern	m	m^e	$c = m^e \bmod n$
encrypt:	0000l000	12	24832	17

	c	c^d	$m = c^d \bmod n$
decrypt:	17	481968572106750915091411825223071697	12

Why does RSA work?

- must show that $c^d \bmod n = m$
  where $c = m^e \bmod n$
- fact: for any x and y: $x^y \bmod n = x^{(y \bmod z)} \bmod n$
  - where $n = pq$ and $z = (p-1)(q-1)$
- thus,
  $c^d \bmod n = (m^e \bmod n)^d \bmod n$
  $= m^{ed} \bmod n$
  $= m^{(ed \bmod z)} \bmod n$
  $= m^1 \bmod n$
  $= m$

RSA: another important property

The following property will be *very* useful later:

$$K_B^-(K_B^+(m)) = m = K_B^+(K_B^-(m))$$

use public key first, followed by private key

use private key first, followed by public key

result is the same!

Why $K_B^-(K_B^+(m)) = m = K_B^+(K_B^-(m))$?

follows directly from modular arithmetic:

$$
\begin{aligned}
(m^e \bmod n)^d \bmod n &= m^{ed} \bmod n \\
&= m^{de} \bmod n \\
&= (m^d \bmod n)^e \bmod n
\end{aligned}
$$

Why is RSA secure?

- suppose you know Bob's public key (n,e). How hard is it to determine d?
- essentially need to find factors of n without knowing the two factors p and q
  - fact: factoring a big number is hard

RSA in practice: session keys

- exponentiation in RSA is computationally intensive
- DES is at least 100 times faster than RSA
- use public key crypto to establish secure connection, then establish second key – symmetric session key – for encrypting data

session key, K_S

- Bob and Alice use RSA to exchange a symmetric key K_S
- once both have K_S, they use symmetric key cryptography

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8.1 What is network security?
8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity, *authentication*

Authentication

Goal: Bob wants Alice to "prove" her identity to him

Protocol ap1.0: Alice says "I am Alice"



Failure scenario??

Authentication

Goal: Bob wants Alice to "prove" her identity to him

Protocol ap1.0: Alice says "I am Alice"



in a network,
Bob can not "see" Alice,
so Trudy simply declares
herself to be Alice

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap2.0: Alice says "I am Alice" in an IP packet containing her source IP address

Failure scenario??

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap2.0: Alice says "I am Alice" in an IP packet containing her source IP address



Trudy can create a packet "spoofing" Alice's address

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap3.0: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her secret password to "prove" it.



Failure scenario??

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap3.0: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her secret password to "prove" it.



playback attack: Trudy records Alice's packet and later plays it back to Bob

Authentication: yet another try

Protocol ap3.1: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her *encrypted* secret password to "prove" it.



Failure scenario??

Authentication: yet another try

Protocol ap3.1: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her *encrypted* secret password to "prove" it.



record and playback *still* works!

Authentication: yet another try

Goal: avoid playback attack

nonce: number (R) used only *once-in-a-lifetime*

ap4.0: to prove Alice "live", Bob sends Alice *nonce*, R. Alice must return R, encrypted with shared secret key



Alice is live, and only Alice knows key to encrypt nonce, so it must be Alice!

Failures, drawbacks?

Authentication: ap5.0

ap4.0 requires shared symmetric key

- can we authenticate using public key techniques?

ap5.0: use nonce, public key cryptography



Bob computes

$$K_A^+(K_A^-(R)) = R$$

and knows only Alice could have the private key, that encrypted R such that

$$K_A^+(K_A^-(R)) = R$$

ap5.0: security hole

man (or woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)



ap5.0: security hole

man (or woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)



difficult to detect:

- Bob receives everything that Alice sends, and vice versa. (e.g., so Bob, Alice can meet one week later and recall conversation!)
- problem is that Trudy receives all messages as well!

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Digital signatures

cryptographic technique analogous to hand-written signatures:

- sender (Bob) digitally signs document, establishing he is document owner/creator.
- *verifiable, nonforgeable:* recipient (Alice) can prove to someone that Bob, and no one else (including Alice), must have signed document

Digital signatures

simple digital signature for message m:

- Bob signs m by encrypting with his private key K_B^-, creating "signed" message, $K_B^-(m)$



Digital signatures

- suppose Alice receives msg m, with signature: m, $K_B^-(m)$
- Alice verifies m signed by Bob by applying Bob's public key K_B^+ to $K_B^-(m)$ then checks $K_B^+(K_B^-(m)) = m$.
- If $K_B^+(K_B^-(m)) = m$, whoever signed m must have used Bob's private key.

Alice thus verifies that:

- Bob signed m
- no one else signed m
- Bob signed m and not m'

non-repudiation:

✓ Alice can take m, and signature $K_B^-(m)$ to court and prove that Bob signed m

Message digests



computationally expensive to public-key-encrypt long messages

goal: fixed-length, easy-to-compute digital "fingerprint"

- apply hash function H to *m*, get fixed size message digest, *H(m)*.

Hash function properties:

- many-to-1
- produces fixed-size msg digest (fingerprint)
- given message digest x, computationally infeasible to find m such that x = H(m)

Internet checksum: poor crypto hash function

Internet checksum has some properties of hash function:

- produces fixed length digest (16-bit sum) of message
- is many-to-one

But given message with given hash value, it is easy to find another message with same hash value:

message	ASCII format
I O U 1	49 4F 55 31
0 0 . 9	30 30 2E 39
9 B O B	39 42 D2 42
	B2 C1 D2 AC

message	ASCII format
I O U 9	49 4F 55 39
0 0 . 1	30 30 2E 31
9 B O B	39 42 D2 42
	B2 C1 D2 AC

different messages but identical checksums!

Digital signature = signed message digest

Bob sends digitally signed message:



Alice verifies signature, integrity of digitally signed message:



Hash function algorithms

- MD5 hash function widely used (RFC 1321)
  - computes 128-bit message digest in 4-step process.
  - arbitrary 128-bit string x, appears difficult to construct msg m whose MD5 hash is equal to x
- SHA-1 is also used
  - US standard [NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1]
  - 160-bit message digest

Recall: ap5.0 security hole

man (or woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)



Public-key certification

- motivation: Trudy plays pizza prank on Bob
  - Trudy creates e-mail order:
    Dear Pizza Store, Please deliver to me four pepperoni pizzas. Thank you, Bob
  - Trudy signs order with her private key
  - Trudy sends order to Pizza Store
  - Trudy sends to Pizza Store her public key, but says it's Bob's public key
  - Pizza Store verifies signature; then delivers four pepperoni pizzas to Bob
  - Bob doesn't even like pepperoni

Certification authorities

- *certification authority (CA):* binds public key to particular entity, E.
- E (person, router) registers its public key with CA.
  - E provides "proof of identity" to CA.
  - CA creates certificate binding E to its public key.
  - certificate containing E's public key digitally signed by CA – CA says "this is E's public key"



Certification authorities

- when Alice wants Bob's public key:
  - gets Bob's certificate (Bob or elsewhere).
  - apply CA's public key to Bob's certificate, get Bob's public key